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Abstract
We construct and estimate a unied model combining three of the main sources of
cross-country income disparities: di¤erences in factor endowments, barriers to technology
adoption and the inappropriateness of frontier technologies to local conditions. The key
components are di¤erent types of workers, distortions to capital accumulation, directed
technical change, costly adoption and spillovers from the world technology frontier. Despite
its parsimonious parametrization, our empirical model provides a good t of GDP data for
up to 86 countries in 1970 and 122 countries in 2000. Removing barriers to technology
adoption would increase the output per worker of the average non-OECD country relative
to the US from 0.19 to 0.61, while increasing skill premia in all countries. Removing barriers
to trade in goods amplies income disparities, induces skill-biased technology adoption
and increases skill premia in the majority of countries. These results are reverted if trade
liberalization is coupled with international IPR protection.
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1 Introduction
New technologies do not di¤use instantaneously, and adoption lags are considered a major
determinant of productivity di¤erences across rms and nations. In a classic paper, Griliches
(1957) documents that new more productive seeds of hybrid corn di¤used slowly across US
agricultural regions, with a 15-year lag between adoption in Iowa and Alabama, and that their
di¤usion was a¤ected by local conditions, such as geography and market potential. The spread
of more recent technologies follows a similar pattern. Kiessling (2009) reports evidence of slow
adoption of information and communication technology di¤usion both between and within
countries. For instance, while personal computers became available in the early 1980s, in 2006
the percentage of the population using computers amounted to 80.6% in US, 36.3% in Spain,
5.6% in China and 2.7% in India. Cross-country studies conrm that technology adoption
depends both on country-specic factors and on characteristics of new technologies. For exam-
ple, a McKinsey (2001) report on India mentions among the main sources of ine¢ ciencies the
fact that rms are too small to benet from the best technologies and that these may require
skills that the country does not possess. The importance of local economic conditions is also
stressed by Caselli and Wilson (2004), who show that countries import technologies comple-
menting their abundant factors, and by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009), who nd that human
capital fosters the adoption of skilled-labor augmenting technologies. At the aggregate level,
there is evidence that di¤erences in technology are a key determinant of cross-country income
disparities. A large body of research measuring total factor productivity (TFP) as the Solow
residual of an aggregate production function typically nds the latter to account for roughly
50% of observed di¤erences in output per worker. Beyond being a measure of our ignorance,
this residual is nothing but a generic notion of technology, i.e., the mapping from factors to
aggregate production.
What all these pieces of evidence suggest is that, if we are to understand income disparities,
we need a theory for how di¤erent types of technologies are developed and adopted across
countries. In turn, this requires unbundling the concept of TFP into a set of heterogeneous
technologies and to identify what country-specic factors facilitate the adoption of certain
innovations more than others. To this end, a parsimonious description of technology is provided
by the following aggregate production function:
Y = K
h
(ALL)
 1
 + (AHH)
 1

i 
 1
1 
; (1)
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were Y , K, H and L are output, physical capital, skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. The
state of technology is identied by the parameters AL and AH , which measure the e¢ ciency
with which the economy uses unskilled and skilled labor, respectively. The parameter , instead,
captures the elasticity of substitution between the two types of workers. Given data on factors
and a value for , any di¤erences in Y can be generated by allowing technology, AL and AH ,
to vary. While accounting exercises based on (1) are certainly useful, the crucial question
is to understand how technologies are developed and why they may di¤er across countries.
Providing a theoretical answer to these questions and confronting it to the data is the main
goal of this paper.
Building on Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) (henceforth, AZ01) and Gancia and Zilibotti
(2009), we propose a theory of directed technical change and technology adoption that yields
a micro-founded version of the aggregate production function (1). In the model, an advanced
economy, identied with the US and called for simplicity the North, develops endogenously
the world technology frontier, represented by the pair (ALN ; AHN ). As in models of horizontal
innovation (see Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) for a survey), the world technology frontier is given
by the stock of existing machines and, as in models of directed technical change (e.g., AZ01
and Acemoglu 2002), R&D e¤ort can be devoted to develop H- or L-complement machines.1
In the benchmark case, we assume that there is no trade in technology e.g., due to the lack of
international protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) so that new machines are sold
in the North only.2 As a result, the equilibrium skill-bias of the world technology frontier is
proportional to the skill-endowment of the North. To capture the advantage of backwardness
emphasized, among others, by Nelson and Phelps (1966), and Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti
(2006) we assume that all other countries can adopt existing technologies at a cost which is
decreasing in their distance from the frontier. Besides this cost, technology adoption - just like
innovation - is prot-driven and depends on local economic conditions, such as the abundance
of complementary factors (K, L and H) and the size of domestic markets. This combination
of the theory of directed technical change with international knowledge spillovers allows us
1The notion of directed technical change stretches back to Kennedy (1964). Acemoglu (1998) constructs
a quality-ladder model of directed technical change to study the patterns of wage inequality in the US in the
1970s and 1980s.
2We relax this assumption in an extension where we introduce international license contracts on the use of
technology.
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to build a tractable model of cross-country technology di¤erences suitable for quantitative
analysis.
The resulting model yields structural equations that can be used to estimate its two key
parameters: the elasticity of substitution between the skilled and unskilled labor, , and the
elasticity of the adoption cost to the technology gap, , capturing exogenous barriers to knowl-
edge ows. From these estimates, our methodology allows us to tease out the relative impor-
tance of two distinct sources of low productivity: technology inappropriateness and distance to
frontier. To see why, note that when barriers to adoption are very low, a country will operate
with the best technologies; yet, to the extent that frontier technologies are highly skill biased
they will be of limited use in skill-scarce countries, thereby generating low aggregate produc-
tivity. On the contrary, countries well inside the frontier are free to choose a more optimal mix
of technologies, so that their low productivity will be mostly explained by barriers to adoption,
rather than the skill-technology mismatch.
To estimate the elasticity of substitution between the skilled and unskilled labor, we use
time-series data on the skill premium and the relative skill supply in the US (the frontier
economy). The second parameter, , measuring barriers to technology adoption, is instead
estimated from a micro-founded version of equation (1). That is, given data on Y , K, H and
L, we search for the constant  (across all adopting countries and also for di¤erent income
groups) that minimizes the sum of squared deviations between predicted and observed relative
output. Despite the parsimonious parameterization, the t of the model is remarkably good,
indicating that the underlying theory of technological change and di¤usion, which places skill
endowment, domestic market size and international spillovers as the cornerstone, is broadly
consistent with the data. Similarly to Caselli and Coleman (2006), we nd that virtually all
adopting countries are inside the world technology frontier, that skill scarce countries tend to
adopt predominantly unskilled-labor complement innovations and that barriers to adoption are
higher in less developed countries. We also nd evidence that barriers to technology adoption
are relatively stable over the period 1970-2000 among non-OECD economies, while they appear
to have fallen for OECD countries. The extreme versions of the model, in which each country
develops local technologies independently or in which all country share the same technology,
are instead rejected by the data. We also compare the t of the model under alternative
specications for the cost of adopting technologies that allow us to vary the strength of market
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size e¤ects and under the assumption of free trade in goods.
With our preferred parameterization, we use the model to perform a series of counter-
factuals. First, we show that removing barriers to technology adoption would increase gross
domestic product per worker (GDP pw) relative to the US from 0.19 to 0.61 for the aver-
age non-OECD country and from 0.68 to 0.91 for the average OECD country. The e¤ect is
particularly strong for small countries, which lack the local market size required to benet
from expensive technologies. Second, we study the e¤ect of institutional changes associated to
the process of globalization, focusing on the integration of markets for goods and technology.
As noted by AZ01 and Acemoglu (2003), trade liberalization may have triggered skill-biased
technical change (SBTC) in the US during the last two decades of the 20th century and this
may have amplied cross-country income di¤erences. To illustrate the global impact of this
phenomenon, we compute the e¤ect both on the world technology frontier and on adopting
countries of removing barriers to trade in goods. As trade with skill-scarce countries increase
the relative price of skill-intensive goods in the skill-abundant North, it fosters the incentives
to introduce skill-complement technologies. The e¤ect on technology adoption is however am-
biguous. On the one hand, the increase in the skill bias of the frontier technology makes the
adoption of skill-complement technologies cheaper. On the other hand, the rise in the rela-
tive price of low-skill-intensive goods in skill-scarce countries promotes the adoption of less
skill-biased technologies. We nd that, given the estimated parameters, trade would induce
most followers to adopt more skill-biased technologies than in the absence of trade. Thus,
trade tends to exacerbate the inappropriateness of technologies to the local endowments of
non-frontier economies. The result is a global increase in skill premia (a factor of 2.9 for the
average country), but also in the cross-country income gap (on average, GDP pw relative to
the US falls by 13 percentage points).3 On the contrary, allowing trade in technology too (i.e.,
the leader can licence its technology to follower countries), by fostering the incentives to in-
troduce unskilled-labor complement innovations, reduces wage inequality and induces income
convergence worldwide.
The paper contributes to a large literature, surveyed in Caselli (2005), aimed at decom-
posing cross-country income disparities into input di¤erences and unmeasured productivity.
We depart from earlier works (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999) by assuming, consistently with all
3We should stress that these very large e¤ects correspond to the extreme experiment of moving from no
trade to completely free trade. Clearly, partial trade liberalization would give smaller e¤ects.
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available evidence, a less than innite elasticity of substitution between workers of di¤erent
skill level and by endogenizing productivity. Among more recent contributions, the closest
paper is Caselli and Coleman (2006), who also decompose income using the aggregate pro-
duction function (1). There are two main di¤erences, however. First, they back out the pair
(AL; AH) using data on input, but also factor prices. On the contrary, our theoretical model
delivers structural equations that can be used to estimate (1) without relying on cross-country
factor prices, which are notoriously di¢ cult to obtain for a large sample and not always of
high quality. Second, when modelling technology choices, they do not endogenize the world
technology frontier. Fadinger (2009) estimates productivity di¤erences across trading countries
by tting both national statistics and the factor content of trade. Yet, he does not endogenize
technologies and their di¤usion, while in this paper we do not use information contained in
trade data.
The paper is also related to the vast literature on international technology di¤usion. The
idea that countries may benet from technologies developed elsewhere was rst put forward
by Nelson and Phelps (1966) and then formalized by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Howitt
(2000) and Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006). Empirical evidence of international tech-
nology spillovers is provided, among others, by Keller (2004) and Caselli and Wilson (2004).
Here, we follow closely the model in Gancia and Zilibotti (2009), to which we add capital
accumulation. More importantly, one of the main contributions is to estimate the resulting
model. The importance of barriers to technology adoption in explaining cross-county income
disparities has been emphasized by Parente and Prescott (1994, 2005). Comin and Hobijn
(2010) and Comin, Easterly and Gong (2009) document that major innovations di¤use slowly
(on average, they are adopted 47 years after their invention), and that di¤erences in the speed
of technology adoption are not only large, but also surprisingly persistent over time.
The fact that technologies originating from advanced countries may be excessively skill
biased for the endowments of less developed countries, and that this may act both as a barrier
to adoption and as source of low productivity, has been put forward by Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1969), Basu and Weil (1998), and AZ01. Our approach is most related to AZ01. The main
di¤erence is that they only focus on the case in which all countries share the same technology.
In the current model, instead, aggregate productivity in less developed countries is relatively
low both because of the technology-skill mismatch identied in AZ01 and because of costly
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adoption.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 builds the benchmark model of a world
economy where a technology leader engages in directed innovation, while a large number of
less advanced countries engage in directed technology adoption. It provides a microfoundation
for the aggregate production function (1) and illustrates three main sources of low aggregate
productivity: lack of capital, distance to frontier and technology inappropriateness. Section 3
extends the model by rst allowing trade in goods and then in technology (IPR protection)
too. Section 4 estimates the model and quanties the relative importance of the three sources
of income di¤erences. The empirical model is then used to perform counterfactual exercises
and sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Benchmark Model
In this section, we present a model of directed technical change closely related to Acemoglu,
Gancia and Zilibotti (2011) and Gancia and Zilibotti (2009). The key ingredients are di¤erent
types of labor (skilled and unskilled workers), cross-country di¤erences in factor endowments
and factor-biased (directed) technical progress. In addition, we consider physical capital accu-
mulation, which was ignored in previous work. Moreover, we emphasize the distinction between
the introduction of frontier technologies (innovation) which is carried out in the "North", and
the sluggish process of imitation and adaptation of such technologies to less developed coun-
tries (the "South"). We refer to the latter as technology adoption. Adoption is assumed to
be cheaper than innovation, creating a laggard advantage. However, since technical change
is directed to the factor endowment of the North, the South faces a menu of technologies to
imitate that are overly skill biased, given its lower skilled endowment.
2.1 Preferences
The world consists of a technology leader (the North), and a set of non-technological leaders
(the South), all populated by innitely lived agents endowed with logarithmic preferences. We
denote by N the frontier economy and by S 2 S^ = fS1; S2; :::; Sng a generic Southern economy.
More formally, the utility function of the representative agent in each country is given by:
UJ =
Z 1
0
e t log(cJt)dt;
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where J 2 fN;Sg and  is the discount rate. The optimal consumption plan satises the Euler
equation, _cJt=cJt = rJt  ; where the interest rate rJt may be di¤erent across countries, since
capital markets are not integrated. We remove time indexes when this is no source of confusion.
2.2 Technology
Final output, used for both consumption and investment, is produced by a representative
competitive rm subject to the following production function:
YJ = K

J

Y
 1

LJ + Y
 1

HJ
 (1 )
 1
; (2)
whereK is capital, YL and YH are intermediate goods produced with unskilled and skilled labor,
respectively, and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between them. Prot maximization
implies that the rental rate of capital equals the marginal product of capital. More formally,
after choosing Y as the numéraire, we have KJ = YJ= (rJJ) ; where J is a wedge capturing
distortions which open a gap between the private and social rate of returns to investments.
When J = 1; there is no distortion, and the standard condition equating the interest rate to
the marginal product of capital holds. Substituting back KJ into (2) yields:
YJ =


rJJ
 
1 

Y
 1

LJ + Y
 1

HJ
 
 1
: (3)
Prot maximization implies then the following inverse demand functions:
PHJ = (1  )


rJJ
 ( 1)
(1 )

YJ
YHJ
 1

and PLJ = (1  )


rJJ
 ( 1)
(1 )

YJ
YLJ
 1

; (4)
where PL and PH are the prices of YL and YH , respectively. Note that PHJ=PLJ = [YLJ=YHJ ]
1
 :
The production function at the sector level is given by:
YLJ = ELJ
Z ALJ
0
yLJ (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
and YHJ = EHJ
Z AHJ
0
yHJ (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
;
where (AL; AH) is the state vector consisting of the measure of intermediate inputs pro-
duced with unskilled and skilled labor, respectively. The terms ELJ  (ALJ)
 2
 1 and EHJ 
(AHJ)
 2
 1 are externalities that make the model consistent with the existence of a balanced
growth path (see Gancia and Zilibotti (2009) for a discussion of such externalities). Note that
the externality vanishes at  = 2.
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The producers of YL and YH are also competitive. Their prot maximization yields the
following relative demand equations:
yLJ (i)
yLJ (j)
=

pLJ (j)
pLJ (i)

and
yHJ (i)
yHJ (j)
=

pHJ (j)
pHJ (i)

;
where pL and pH denote the price of intermediates.
The intermediate good sector is monopolistic, with each producer holding the patent for
a single variety. The production function for each intermediate input, yLJ (i) and yHJ (i), is
linear in the type of labor employed,
yLJ (i) = lJ (i) and yHJ (i) = ZhJ (i) ;
where Z  1 is a parameter that will allow us to match the level of the skill premium in the
benchmark case. The industry equilibrium is subject to the resource constraints
R ALJ
0 lJ (i) di 
LJ and
R AHJ
0 hJ (i) di  HJ ; where LJ and HJ are assumed to be in xed supply. As the
monopolists face a demand curve with the constant price elasticity of , it is optimal for them to
set prices equal to pLJ (i) = pLJ = (1  1=) 1wLJ and pHJ (i) = pHJ = (1  1=) 1wHJ=Z;
where wL and wH are the wage of unskilled and skilled workers, respectively. This pricing
formula also implies that prots per rm are a fraction 1= of revenues:
LJ (i) =
pLJ lJ (i)

and HJ (i) =
pHJZhJ (i)

: (5)
Using symmetry and labor market clearing yields lJ (i) = LJ=ALJ and hJ (i) = HJ=AHJ ,
which in turn allows to express sectorial output as:
YLJ = ALJLJ and YHJ = AHJZHJ : (6)
Note that output in each sector is a linear function of labor and of the state of technology.
Plugging (6) into (4) yields the relative price:
~PJ  PHJ
PLJ
=
h
~AJZ~hJ
i  1

; (7)
where ~A  AH=AL is the skill bias of the technology and ~h  H=L is the relative skill
endowment. Note that "tilde" denotes relative (skill-to-unskill) variables. Relative wages and
prots can be found using (7), and noting that pLJLJ = PLJYLJ and pHJZHJ = PHJYHJ :
~wJ  wHJ
wLJ
= Z
PHJ
PLJ
AHJ
ALJ
=
h
Z ~AJ
i1  1

h
~hJ
i  1

(8)
~J  HJ
LJ
=
PHJ
PLJ
ZHJ
LJ
= ~A
  1

J

Z~hJ
1  1

: (9)
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Equation (9) shows that the relative protability, H=L, has two components: a price e¤ect,
whereby rents are higher in sectors producing more expensive goods, and a market size e¤ect,
whereby rents are higher in bigger sectors.
2.3 Innovation in the North
Frontier innovation is carried out in the North, and takes the form of the introduction of new
varieties of intermediate inputs. We assume that the development of any new variety requires
a xed cost of  units of the numéraire Y . The direction of innovation is endogenous, i.e., each
innovator can decide to design a variety that can be used in the H or L sector. As patents
are innitely lived, the value of a rm either VL or VH is the present discounted value of
its future prot stream. Free entry implies that neither VL nor VH can exceed the innovation
cost, . Since in a balanced growth path (a steady state) PL, PH and the interest rate r are
constant, then VLN = LN=rN = VHN = HN=rN = ; which implies in turn that ~N = 1:
The equalization of prot ows yields the equilibrium skill bias of technology in the North:
~AN =

Z~hN
 1
: (10)
Substituting ~AN into (8) yields the steady-state skill premium:
~wN = Z
 1

~hN
 2
: (11)
To nd the growth rate, we note that the interest rate is pinned down by either of the two
free entry conditions, e.g., rN = HN= = PHNZHN= () : Using (3), (4) and (6) to eliminate
PHN , normalizing N = 1; and using the Euler equation yields the balanced growth rate of
the economy,
gN = rN    = (1  )1  
"
L 1N + (ZHN )
 1
() 1
# 1 
 1
  : (12)
It can be shown that, along the balanced growth path, YN , cN , KN , AHN and ALN all grow
at the rate gN .
2.4 Directed Technology Adoption in the South
Southern countries are assumed to be skill scarce, namely, ~hS < ~hN for all S 2 S^, and to start
from a lower technology level in both the skilled and unskilled sector. They can adopt at a
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cost the technologies developed in the North. To begin with, we assume that there is neither
trade in goods nor international protection of IPR. Each of these assumption will be relaxed
later on. The lack of IPR implies that innovators in the North cannot sell their copyrights to
rms located in the South, so that the only market they have access to is the domestic one. In
the absence of trade, the equilibrium conditions in the North are una¤ected by the presence
of the South.
The equilibrium conditions of Southern economies are analogous to those of the North, ex-
cept for technology adoption, which di¤ers from the innovation process. In particular, Southern
countries take the state of the frontier technology, ALN and AHN , as given. Technology adop-
tion is modeled as a costly investment activity similar to innovation. Following the earlier
literature, we assume that, due to technological spillovers, the cost of adopting a technology
in a sector, cLS and cHS , is a negative function of the technological gap in that sector:
cLS = 

ALS
ALN

and cHS = 

AHS
AHN

;   0; (13)
where ALN and AHN represent the world technology frontiers in the two sectors. That is,
the farther behind a country is relative to the skill-specic frontier, the cheaper it is to adopt
technologies in that sector. With this formulation, the total cost of adopting the entire set of
z-complement technologies (with z 2 fH; Lg) is:

Z AzN
0

AzS
AzN

dAzS =
AzN
1 + 
:
This expression shows that  can be interpreted as an inverse measure of barriers to technol-
ogy adoption in the South. All intermediate inputs adopted in the South are sold by local
monopolists.
In steady state, free entry implies HS=LS = cHS=cLS : Using this condition together with
equations (9), (10) and (13), we can solve for the skill bias of the technology in the South:
~AS =

Z~hS
  1
1+ ~A

1+
N = Z
 1
h
~hS  ~hN
i  1
1+
: (14)
Technology adoption in the South depends on the skill endowment of the North and of the
local economy. On the one hand, local skill abundance increases the protability of adopting
skill-complement innovations. On the other hand, skill abundance in the North means that the
frontier technology is more skill biased, and that skilled technologies are cheaper to imitate.
Note also that the skill bias of the technology in the adopting economy is increasing in ,
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capturing the speed of technology transfer. In particular, in the limit case of  = 0 (prohibitive
barriers) each economy develops local technologies independently from the world frontier, and
the skill abundance in the North becomes irrelevant: ~AS =

Z~hS
 1
. To the opposite case,
as  ! 1; adoption is free so that the South is using the technology of the North. In this
case, it is the local skill endowment that does not matter: ~AS = ~AN =

Z~hN
 1
: The latter
is the case analyzed by AZ01.
2.5 Productivity Differences
As long as  > 0; a balanced growth path features rS = rN  r; with the South and the
North growing at the same rate, in spite of there being neither trade nor factor mobility. The
model yields then predictions for steady-state output and productivity di¤erences as functions
of factor endowments and of exogenous parameters.
Proposition 1 For any S 2 S^; the steady-state output ratio relative to the frontier is
YS
YN
=
0BBBB@

KS
KN
 2664L
( 1)(1+)
1+
S +

Z~hN
 ( 1)2
1+  (ZHS)
( 1)(1+)
1+
L
( 1)(1+)
1+
N +

Z~hN
 ( 1)2
1+  (ZHN )
( 1)(1+)
1+
3775
(1 )(1+)
( 1)(1+)
1CCCCA
1+
+
 fAUTS ;
(15)
where KS=KN = (YS=YN ) = (S=N ) :
Proof. The production function, (2), yields
YS
YN
=

ALS
ALN
1 KS
KN
 24L  1S + ~A  1S (ZHS)  1
L
 1

N +
~A
 1

N (ZHN )
 1

35
(1 )
 1
: (16)
To obtain the equilibrium expression for ALS=ALN ; recall rst that
LS
LN
=
cLS

=

ALS
ALN

and
HS
HN
=
cHS

=

AHS
AHN

; (17)
where the relative prots can be written as
LS
LN
=
PLSYLSALN
PLNYLNALS
=
PLSLS
PLNLN
; (18)
using (5) and (6). Next, note that, since the price of YL equals its marginal product, then:
PLS
PLN
=

ALS
ALN
 KS
KN
 24L  1S + ~A  1S (ZHS)  1
L
 1

N +
~A
 1

N (ZHN )
 1

35
(1 )
 1  1
LS
LN
  1

: (19)
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Next, (17), (18) and (19) imply that:
ALS
ALN
=

LS
LN
  1
(+)

KS
KN
 
+
24L  1S + ~A  1S (ZHS)  1
L
 1

N +
~A
 1

N (ZHN )
 1

35   1( 1)(+) : (20)
We can now use (20) to substitute away ALS=ALN into (16):
YS
YN
=

LS
LN
 (1 )( 1)
(+)

KS
KN
 1+
+
24L  1S + ~A  1S (ZHS)  1
L
 1

N +
~A
 1

N (ZHN )
 1

35
(1 )(1+)
( 1)(+)
: (21)
Finally, eliminating ~AN and ~AS from (21) using (10) and (14), respectively, and rearranging
terms, yields (15).
The formula of the output gap (15) resembles the ratio between two identical aggregate
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions. This is remarkable, since coun-
tries use in fact di¤erent technologies. However, the implied production function di¤ers from
standard CES functions such as (1) in two respects: First, it features increasing returns to
scale, parameterized by the exponent (1 + ) = (+ ) > 1: Second, the structural parameter
 implies a particular restriction between the long-run elasticity of substitution between high-
and low-skill labor and the "weight" of the CES function,

Z~hN
 ( 1)2
1+
: Given the structural
parameters ; ;  and Z, the right-hand side of the relative GDP equation is fully determined
by the data of capital, low-skill labor and high-skill labor. Dividing both sides by the number
of agents (workers) yields an accounting equation for GDP per capita (per worker).
As noted above, income di¤erences depend on a scale e¤ect, namely, larger countries are
predicted to be ceteris paribus more productive. Interestingly, this e¤ect disappears as barriers
to adoption vanish and all countries converge to the technology frontier. Indeed, as  ! 1,
we have that ~AS ! ~AN and
lim
!1
YS
YN
=

KS
KN
 2664L
 1

S +

Z~hN
 ( 1)2
  (ZHS)
 1

L
 1

N +

Z~hN
 ( 1)2
  (ZHN )
 1

3775
(1 )
 1
; (22)
which is the equation estimated by AZ01, who also set  = 2.
Figure 1 shows how di¤erent parameters a¤ect productivity di¤erences. The gure depicts
economies with equally sized total labor forces and with  = 2. The parameters of the North
are xed at ~hN = N = 1; and Z = 1:5; implying that AHN=ALN = 1:5. Then, we consider
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Southern economies with di¤erent skill endowments, ~hS , barriers to technology adoption, ,
and investment wedges, S . Panel (a) shows the pattern of technology adoption, i.e., the equi-
librium proximity to the frontier in the L and H sector, respectively for di¤erent combinations
of  and ~hS ; while holding constant S = 1:2. The gure plots three curves, each corresponding
to a di¤erent relative skill endowment: ~hS = 0:9 (highest curve), ~hS = 0:5 (intermediate curve)
and ~hS = 0:1 (lowest curve). Moving along each curve from left to right yields points with
increasing . Dots single out some particular values of . The parameter  a¤ects both the
distance to frontier (lower  implies a larger gap) and the skill bias of technology adoption.
In particular, the lower  the more the technology will reect local conditions. As we increase
 the technology becomes more skill biased, as one can see by drawing rays from the origin
through di¤erent dotted points along a line. For large levels of , the technological di¤erences
between non-frontier economies with di¤erent endowments become very small, and are all
well approximated by the case studied by AZ01 in which all countries adopt immediately the
frontier technology. Panel (b) shows the same combination of parameters, but with a larger
investment wedge S = 1:5. A larger S reduces technology adoption, especially for countries
with higher skill ratios. For example, a country with ~hS = 0:5 and  = 2 adopts 85% of the
high-skill and 98% of the low-skill technologies if S = 1:2, while it adopts 80% of the high-skill
and 92% of the low-skill technologies if S = 1:5.
Panels (c) and (d) display the e¤ect of  and ~hS on output per worker di¤erences and
the skill premium. As in panel (a), the investment wedge is xed at S = 1:2 and each of
the three curves represents a di¤erent ~hS . Panel (c) shows that, as long as  < 2; barriers to
technology adoption are important. However, for larger values of  the lion share of productivity
di¤erences originates from technology inappropriateness, i.e., the excessive skill bias of frontier
technologies. For instance, if ~hS = 0:1 and  = 2; removing all barriers would only reduce
18 percent of the distance to the frontier. In contrast, 74 percent of the productivity gap is
due to technology mismatch, and 14 percent is due to the investment wedge. Moving back
to panel (a), one can note that in this case more than 90 percent of the technologies used by
low-skill workers are already in use when  = 2 and ~hS = 0:1. Thus, slashing barriers triggers
mainly the adoption of high-skill technologies (when  = 2 the Southern economy only adopts
60 percent of the high-skill technologies). However, this yields only modest productivity gains
since only about 11% of the labor force is skilled.
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The skill bias of technology is reected in the wage inequality. The steady-state skill
premium is given by ~wS = Z 1~h
  2
1+
S
~h
( 1)2
1+
N , where ~wS is increasing in , ranging from
~wSj=0 = Z( 1)~h 2S to ~wSj!1 = Z
( 1)~h 
1

S h
( 1)2

N : Panel (d) of Figure 1 shows the long-run
e¤ect of  on wages for alternative relative skill endowments in the South. Increasing  induces
a rise in the skill premium which is a direct consequence of the previous nding that a higher
relative fraction of high-skill technologies are adopted as  increases. Moreover, starting from
 = 2 , the rise in the skill premium is steeper in countries with low skill ratios because there
are more high-skill technologies left to adopt.
3 Extensions: Trade and IPR
So far, we have only allowed countries to interact through technological spillovers. In this
section we extend the analysis rst to economies that trade in goods and then to economies
that, in addition, can import technologies through licensing contracts. We refer to the latter
case as full IPR enforcement.
3.1 International Trade
In this section, we assume that the intermediate good YL and YH can be traded internationally
without frictions. Under free trade, there is a single world price for PL and PH :
~Pw  P
w
H
PwL
=

Y wL
Y wH
 1

(23)
where the superscript w refer to worldwide variables. Hence, Y wL = ALNLN +
Pn
j=1ALSjLSj
and Y wH = AHNZHN +
Pn
j=1AHSjZHSj . All equations in section 2.2 continue to hold, with
local prices being now equal to the world price.
Consider, next, the innovation process in the North. The key observation is that the
North continues to be the relevant market for new frontier technologies, since there is no IPR
protection in the South. The prot ows of Northern rms are, then, LN = PwL LN= and
HN = P
w
HZHN=: In a balanced-growth equilibrium, ~N = 1; which in turn implies that
~Pw =

Z~hN
 1
: Using (23) and rearranging terms (see proof below) leads to the following
Lemma.
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Lemma 1 In a free trade environment, the skill bias of the frontier technology is given by:
~AN = ~A
trade
N 

Z~hN
 1
h^
>

Z~hN
 1
; (24)
where
h^ 
1 +
Pn
j=1

HSj
HN
 1+

1 +
Pn
j=1

LSj
LN
 1+

< 1: (25)
The skill bias of technology in country S 2 S^ is given by
~AS = ~A
trade
S 

Z~hN
 1
h^
 
~hS
~hN
! 1
: (26)
Proof. Using (23) to substitute away ~Pw from the equation ~Pw =

Z~hN
 1
yields:
Z~hN =
24Z ~AN
0@Pnj=1 AHSjAHN HSj +HNPn
j=1
ALSj
ALN
LSj + LN
1A35
1

:
Solving out for ~AN yields:
~AN =

Z~hN
 1 
0@ 1 +Pnj=1 ALSjALN LSjLN
1 +
Pn
j=1
AHSj
AHN
HSj
HN
1A  ~AtradeN : (27)
We must now solve for the skill-specic distance-to-frontier terms. To this aim, note that,
on the one hand, HS=HN = HS=HN and LS=LN = LS=LN . On the other hand, in a
balanced growth path, HS=HN = cHS= and LS=LN = cLS=: Thus, cHS = HS=HN
and cLS = LS=LN : Then, using (13) to eliminate cHS and cLS yields:
AHS
AHN
=

HS
HN
1=
; (28)
ALS
ALN
=

LS
LN
1=
: (29)
Plugging (28)-(29) into (27) yields (24). Finally, (26) follows immediately from (24), (28) and
(29).
The numerator of (24) is identical to its no-trade counterpart, (10). The denominator is
smaller than unity, since Southern economies are skill scarce relative to the North. Thus, trade
increases the skill bias of the frontier technology. This result generalizes the nding of AZ01
15
to an environment in which technology adoption is costly. Equation (24) also shows that the
"trade multiplier" depends on  and on the relative market size and skill endowment of the two
economies. ~AN increases with the di¤erence in the skill endowment between the North and
the South. Trade increases the relative price of the good that is intensive in the factor that
is relatively abundant in each country (i.e., ~P in the North) and the e¤ect is larger the more
di¤erent factor endowments are. Then, the stronger the increase in ~P in the North relative to
the no-trade environment, the larger the skill bias induced by trade. Barriers (i.e., a reduction
in ) increase ~AN . The intuition behind this result is that since the frontier technology is skill
biased, technology transfer reduces the di¤erence in e¤ective endowments. In other words,
barriers reduce the skill bias of adoption, thereby strengthening the North-South pattern of
specialization in production. As a consequence, the price e¤ect is larger when barriers are
higher.
The e¤ect of trade on the direction of technology adoption in the South (equation (26)) is
instead ambiguous. On the one hand, trade increases the relative price of low-skill-intensive
goods in the South, accelerating the adoption of low-skill technologies. On the other hand, the
higher skill bias at the frontier makes it cheaper to adopt skilled technologies.4
The following proposition provides an expression for output di¤erences the analogue of
equation (15) under free trade.
Proposition 2 Assume free international trade in the intermediate goods YH and YL: For any
S 2 S^; the steady-state output ratio relative to the frontier is:
YS
YN
=

KS
KN
0BB@L
1+

S +
(Z~hN)
( 1) (1+)

h^
 (ZHS)
1+

L
1+

N +
(Z~hN)
( 1) (1+)

h^
 (ZHN )
1+

1CCA
1 
 f tradeS ; (30)
where KS=KN = (YS=YN ) = (S=N ) :
Proof. Rewrite the production function as YJ = (KJ)


Y^J
1 
; where Y^J 

Y^
 1

LJ + Y^
 1

HJ
 
 1
and
Y^LJ and Y^HJ denote the quantities used in nal production in country J: Due to trade, these
quantities di¤er from the respective local production levels (which we continue to denote by
4More formally, ~AtradeS = ~AS = h^
 1

~hS=~hN
 +1(+1)
, showing that trade increases (decreases) the skill bias of
technology adoption if  is su¢ ciently large (small).
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YLJ and YHJ). Balanced trade implies that
Pw
Y^
Y^J = P
w
HJ Y^HJ + P
w
LJ Y^LJ = P
w
HJAHJZHJ + P
w
LJALJLJ ; (31)
where Pw
Y^
=
h
(PwL )
1  + (PwH )
1 
i1=(1 )
is the same for all countries. Thus, for any S 2 S^; we
can write:
YS
YN
=

KS
KN
 Y^S
Y^N
!1 
=

KS
KN
 PwHAHSZHS + PwL ALSLS
PwHAHNZHN + P
w
L ALNLN
1 
; (32)
where the second equality comes from (31) and from the fact that Y^S=Y^N = PwY^ Y^S=

Pw
Y^
Y^N

:
Rearranging terms yields:
YS
YN
=

KS
KN
 ALSLS
ALNLN
 1 +
~Pw ~ASZ~hS
1 + ~Pw ~ANZ~hN
!1 
: (33)
Then, using (29) and (23) to eliminate ALS=ALN and ~Pw; respectively, and rearranging terms,
yields (30).
As emphasized in Ventura (2005) and Fadinger (2009), trade a¤ects the shape of countries
aggregate production possibility frontier. In particular, for given technology, the elasticity of
substitution between YLS and YHS

equivalently, between L(1+)=S and H
(1+)=
S

is now in-
nite, instead of , because all countries face the same world prices. The exponent (1 + ) =  1
still captures the extent of the scale e¤ect in adoption.
3.2 IPR (Licensing of Technologies)
In this section, we maintain free trade and also allow frontier technologies to be licensed
from Northern to Southern (monopolist) rms in exchange of a perpetual royalty per unit
produced in the South. For simplicity, we assume that when a technology is licensed there
are no additional adoption costs. While some local rms could in principle choose to adopt
frontier technologies that have not yet been licensed, in equilibrium all technologies will be
licensed to the South as soon as they are introduced in the North.5 Thus, no room is left for
unlicensed technology adoption. Intuitively, this follows from the assumption that innovators
can transfer technologies at zero costs. Therefore, no matter how low the cost of unlicensed
adoption is, Northern producers will bid down the license cost and win the race. The discussion
is summarized by the following Lemma.
5After a technology has been licensed to a rm in country S; there is no reason for a rm to pay a cost to
produce the same variety, since Bertrand competition would bring the prot of the entrant rst to zero.
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Lemma 2 Suppose that Northern producers can license their technology. Then, there exists a
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium such that the South adopts instantaneously all tech-
nologies introduced in the North. All prots made in the Southern market are transferred to
Northern rms as royalties.
Full IPR protection entails both costs and benets for the South. On the one hand, the
South must transfer to the North the entire prot ow of intermediate producers. On the
other hand, the South can adopt immediately all technologies (similar to the case of  ! 1
in the benchmark model). In addition, IPR enforcement a¤ects the direction of technical
change, reducing the skill bias of the frontier technology. To see this, note that in steady
state the present discounted value of the royalties paid by country Sj are 'LSj = LSj=r and
'HS = HSj=r: Including royalties, the zero-prot conditions for innovation yield:
 
nX
j=1
'LSj =
LN
r
; and  
nX
j=1
'HSj =
HN
r
:
The equilibrium skill bias, ~AN (where ~AS = ~AN ); is the determined implicitly by the following
equation:
1 =
HN +
Pn
j=1 HSj
LN +
Pn
j=1 LSj
=
PwHZHN +
Pn
j=1 P
w
HZHSj
PwL LN +
Pn
j=1 P
w
L LSj
= ~PwZ~hw;
where ~hw 

HN +
Pn
j=1HSj

=

LN +
Pn
j=1 LSj

: This yields ~Pw =

Z~hw
 1
. Then, using
(23), one obtains that ~AN = ~AS = ~AIPRN 

Z~hw
 1
, and ~wN = ~wS = ~w = Z 1

~hw
 2
.
That is, there is factor price equalization and both ~AIPRN and ~wN are now smaller. Moreover,
for given Z, the skill premium may even turn negative. To prevent this unreasonable outcome,
we assume that skilled workers can take unskilled jobs and that a skilled worker produces Z
times as much as an unskilled worker regardless of the sector of employment. This implies that
there is a lower bound ~w  Z. When this lower bound is binding, the allocation of workers
across the two sectors adjusts in order to keep ~w = Z. This leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume free international trade in the intermediate goods YH and YL and IPR
protection (licensing) in the South. For any S 2 S^; the steady-state output ratio relative to the
frontier is:
YS
YN
=

KS
KN
 LS + ~wHS
LN + ~wHN
1 
 f IPRS ; (34)
where KS=KN = (YS=YN ) = (S=N ), ~h
w =

H +
Pn
j=1HSj

=

L+
Pn
j=1 LSj

and ~w =
max
n
Z 1(~hw) 2; Z
o
:
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Proof. The argument is parallel to the proof of Proposition 2. When ~w > Z, one obtains
the analogue of expression (33),
YS
YN
=

KS
KN
 LS
LN
1 + ~Pw ~ANZ~hS
1 + ~Pw ~ANZ~hN
!1 
; (35)
where the only di¤erences between (33) and (35) is that in the latter ALS = ALN and ~AN =
~AS : Next, substituting to ~Pw and ~AN the respective expressions (i.e., ~Pw =

Z~hw
 1
and
~AN =

Z~hw
 1
); and rearranging terms, leads to (34). When ~w = Z, a similar argument
applies after noticing that:
PwH Y^HJ + P
w
L Y^LJ
PwH Y^HN + P
w
L Y^LN
=
wwHHJ + w
w
LLJ
wwHHN + w
w
LLN
=
ZHJ + LJ
ZHN + LN
:
Cross-country productivity di¤erences are smaller under full IPR. However, it becomes
important to draw a distinction between GDP and (Gross National Product) GNP: the GNP
of the North now includes the royalties paid by Southern rms. In general, it is ambiguous
whether the GNP ratio increases with IPR. The growth rate of the world economy is unam-
biguously larger.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we provide a quantitative assessment of the theory. The strategy is to use the
no-trade economy of section 2 as the benchmark for a development accounting exercise. More
precisely, we consider a relative production function of the form:
yS
yN
=

S

N
 HN + LN
HS + LS
 fAUTS ; (36)
where fAUTS is given by (15).
6 Equation (36) allows for exogenous Hicks-neutral TFP di¤er-
ences (i.e., the term 
S=
N ) that are alien to our theory. Therefore, the success of our theory
is measured by the extent to which the empirical variation in output and productivity can be
accounted for without resorting to di¤erences in 
.
In the spirit of the development accounting literature (e.g., Caselli, 2005), we calibrate the
key parameters, whenever this is possible. In particular, we set  = 0:35 to match the non-labor
6Recall that, although the countries use di¤erent technologies, our theory is consistent with a common
representation of the aggregate CES production function featuring increasing returns to scale.
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share of GDP in industrialized countries, calibrate  and Z so as to match the time evolution
of the skill premium in the frontier economy using the predictions of our theory, and estimate
 so as to obtain the best t of cross-country productivity di¤erences in two cross-sections of
up to 122 countries (see section 4.4.2 for more discussion). As it is customary, we use the
no-trade scenario as the baseline case, and assess how successfully the benchmark model can
account for the cross-country productivity distribution in 1970 and 2000. Then, we perform
a number of theory-based counterfactuals including: (i) slashing all barriers to technology
adoption, (ii) opening up the world economy to free trade, and (iii) allowing, in addition,
perfect international IPR enforcement. We study the changes in the long-run distribution of
productivity di¤erences that each of these changes would trigger.
4.1 Data Description
Since our analysis focuses on balanced-growth equilibria, we do not attempt to t high-
frequency data, and focus on the distribution of cross-country productivity di¤erences in 1970
and 2000. We assume the US to be the frontier economy, and calibrate  and Z using the change
in the skill premium and the skill ratio between 1970 and 2000 in the United States from the
March Current Population Survey (CPS) cleaned by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008).7 Like
these authors, we only consider full-time, full-year workers aged 16 to 64 with 0 to 39 years
of potential experience. We exclude female workers and workers with earnings below $67 per
week in 1982 dollars, as well as workers with allocated earnings. We calculate relative wages as
the ratio of the CPS sampling weighted average earnings for di¤erent education levels. In par-
ticular, we focus on high school graduates vs. non-high school graduates and college graduates
vs. non-college graduates.
The data on output, investment, population and the labor force are from Heston, Summers
and Aten (2009). The estimates of the capital stock are generated using the perpetual inventory
method (see, e.g., Caselli (2005)). For the relative skill endowment, we use two data sets:
Barro and Lee (2010) and Cohen and Soto (2007). These data sets contain information on
the fraction of the population aged 25 and above with a high school or a college degree. The
stock of skilled and unskilled workers is then simply calculated by multiplying the labor force
7 In practice, we use the observations of 1971 and 2001 since the reported earnings are for the previous year.
The two data sets are available online from David H. Autors website.
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with the corresponding skill fraction in the population. Following Hall and Jones (1999), we
perform a natural resource correction on GDP by subtracting the fraction of value added in the
mining and quarrying sector according to National Accounts O¢ cial Country Data accessed
via UNdata. Because for some countries value added in the mining and quarrying sector is not
reported on an annual basis, we linearly interpolate the missing data points for 1970 and 2000
if necessary. We drop Kuwait which is a strong outlier in terms of GDP pw in 1970.8 We end
up with a repeated cross-section of 86 (1970) to 122 (2000) countries when using the education
data from Barro and Lee (2010), while we have 73 (1970) to 85 (2000) countries when using the
data from Cohen and Soto (2007). In an appendix available from our webpages we repeat the
analysis restricting the balanced sample of countries for which information is available both in
1970 and 2000 and nd very similar results.
4.2 Calibration
4.2.1 Elasticity of Substitution
We identify  and Z using equation (11) given the evolution of the skill premium in the US.
More formally, we set  and Z so as to match exactly the equation:
log ( ~wUS;t) = (  1) log(Z) + (  2) log

~hUS;t

; (37)
where t 2 f1970; 2000g : Hence
 = 2 +
log ( ~wUS;2000)  log ( ~wUS;1970)
log

~hUS;2000

  log

~hUS;1970
 : (38)
The skill premia as well as the skill ratios are taken from the March CPS. As discussed above,
we use two alternative measures of skill: secondary and tertiary school. The wage premium for
high school graduates over non-high school graduates increased from 1.40 in 1970 to 2.02 in
2000, while the wage premium for college graduates over non-college graduates increased from
1.57 in 1970 to 1.88 in 2000. The ratio of high school graduates over non-high school graduates
in the population in working age increased during the same period from 2.59 to 9.30, while
the ratio of college graduates over non-college graduates increased from 0.21 to 0.43. Since in
8The inclusion of Kuwait does not change our main results. In Table 8 of the appendix we report the
estimation results for a sample that includes Kuwait.
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many OECD economies a large share of the population nishes secondary school, we regard
tertiary education as the most appropriate measure of skill for our theory.
Equations (37)-(38) pin down  and Z: Since both the skill ratio and the relative skill supply
increased sharply in the United States during 19702000, the two equations imply that  > 2.
Table 1 summarizes the baseline calibration for  and Z conditional on the skill measure. In
the table (and for future reference), sec stands for "secondary school completed" whereas tert
stands for "tertiary school completed".
Calibration
Skill measure  Z
sec 2.29 1.05
tert 2.25 1.96
Table 1: Baseline calibration
In our model, the parameter  has the structural interpretation of a short-run elasticity be-
tween high- and low-skill labor. Other studies (e.g., Ciccone and Peri (2005)) provide estimates
of such an elasticity of substitution in the interval [1:4; 2]. Since our estimate of  falls outside
of this range, we consider lower values in Section 4.4.1. Note that if we calibrate  to lower
values, we must allow Z to increase between 1970 and 2000, or else the theory would predict,
counterfactually, a decline in the skill premium. In other words, our estimate  > 2 appears to
be consistent with the prediction of our theory, whereas lower values of  are rejected by our
estimation unless we assume that there are other exogenous drivers of skill-biased technical
change, captured by an increase in Z.
4.2.2 Barriers to Technology Adoption
Having calibrated ; Z and  as described above, we estimate  by full information maximum
likelihood (FIML) using the following econometric model:
log

yS
yUS

= log

fAUTS 
HN + LN
HS + LS

+ log "S ;
where fAUTS is given by (15), and log "S is an i.i.d. normally distributed disturbance with mean
zero.
Table 2 shows the estimation results with robust standard errors in parentheses. The four
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rows refer to di¤erent skill categories (sec and tert) and data sets (Barro-Lee (BL) and Cohen-
Soto (CS)). Columns 1 and 2 report the point estimate of  using the whole sample. Then, we
allow  to vary between OECD (columns 3 and 4) and non-OECD countries (columns 5 and 6).
The results show that  is signicantly lower in non-OECD countries,9 which is consistent with
the interpretation that poor countries have larger barriers. Since there remains a great deal
of heterogeneity within non-OECD countries, we split further the subsample into sub-Saharan
(columns 7 and 8) and other non-OECD countries (columns 9 and 10).10 The di¤erences in
barriers to technology adoption between both the sub-Saharan and other non-OECD countries
and OECD and non-OECD countries are in all but one cases highly signicant.11
Another pattern emerges from the table: The estimated  approximately doubles between
19702000 for OECD countries, while there is no big change for non-OECD countries. This
suggests that technological integration increased mostly within the set of industrialized coun-
tries.
4.2.3 Results
Figure 2 plots the predicted GDP pw (log-di¤erence from the US) against the actual GDP
pw for all countries, using educational variables from the Barro-Lee data set and allowing 
to di¤er across OECD, sub-Saharan and other non-OECD countries, as in Table 2. Panels
9We classify as OECD all countries that were OECD members in 2000 (same classication in both 1970 and
2000 to limit endogeneity issues). Including only countries that were OECD members in 1970 yields similar
results. The estimates for OECD countries are then higher while those for non-OECD countries remain almost
unchanged. For instance, the point estimate for OECD countries in the third row of Table 2 would be 6.61
(1.80) in 1970 and 21.50 (10.26) in 2000 instead of 5.91 (1.48) in 1970 and 11.71 (3.37) in 2000.
10We do not include Mauritius among the sub-Saharan countries, due to its special geographical and economic
conditions (see Subramanian and Roy 2001). Including Mauritius would not cause dramatic changes in the point
estimates. For instance, the third row in Table 2 would read 2.33 (0.20) in 1970 and 2.52 (0.30) for sub-Saharan
countries and 3.83 (0.48) in 1970 and 3.94 (0.45) in 2000 for the other non-OECD countries.
11 In 1970, the point estimate for sub-Saharan countries is lower than the point estimate for the other non-
OECD countries at the 1 percent level of signicance across all specications. In 2000, barriers are signicantly
lower for the tert skill category at the 1 percent (BL) and 5 percent level (CS). For the sec skill category, the
di¤erences are signicant at the 5 percent for BL and close to the 10 percent level of signicance for CS. OECD
countries have signicantly lower barriers than non-OECD countries at the 1 percent level in 2000 for the tert
skill category, while they are at least lower at the 5 percent level of signicance for the sec skill category and in
1970 across all specications.
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All countries OECD Non-OECD
All Sub-Sahara Others
1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000
Data Skill (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
BL sec 4.84 5.38 10.72 18.66 4.51 4.80 3.17 3.80 6.13 5.33
(0.50) (0.54) (3.60) (8.27) (0.47) (0.49) (0.31) (0.47) (1.07) (0.72)
CS sec 3.78 3.98 6.40 11.32 3.75 3.48 2.25 3.00 4.90 3.77
(0.35) (0.38) (1.09) (2.47) (0.35) (0.34) (0.24) (0.32) (0.60) (0.52)
BL tert 3.19 3.78 5.91 11.71 3.02 3.38 2.25 2.35 3.88 4.05
(0.25) (0.33) (1.48) (3.37) (0.25) (0.30) (0.19) (0.24) (0.47) (0.47)
CS tert 3.23 2.83 5.53 8.41 3.05 2.46 1.97 1.86 4.14 2.92
(0.28) (0.24) (0.96) (1.37) (0.28) (0.21) (0.19) (0.13) (0.45) (0.36)
Obs. (BL/CS) 85/71 121/83 19/17 29/23 66/54 92/60 23/19 23/19 43/35 69/41
Table 2: Baseline estimation
(a)-(c) use the secondary school educational measure for years 1970 and 2000, respectively,
whereas Panels (b)-(d) use the tertiary education measure for the same years. In an appendix
available from our webpages we plot the corresponding gure that is obtained by imposing a
common  over the entire sample. Whenever a point lies on the 45-degree line, the theory
ts the data perfectly. Whenever a point lies above (below) the 45-degree line, the model
underpredicts (overpredicts) the productivity di¤erences between that country and the US.
The t is altogether good, although there are some outliers, among them, Malta, Cyprus
and Hong-Kong which lie signicantly below the 45-degree line. This is not surprising, since
these countries are classied as non-OECD countries (and thus pooled in the estimation of 
with poorer economies), although they are very open economies sharing more commonalities
with the OECD countries than with the rest of non-OECD countries. Since the estimation
forces them to have large barriers, the model largely overpredicts their productivity di¤erence
relative to the US. If one merges these three countries with the OECD, they cease to be outliers.
Likewise, Bahrain, Barbados, Brunei, Mauritius and Qatar (also below the 45-degree line) are
small economies with special characteristics that make them atypical non-OECD economies.
Among the countries lying signicantly above the 45-degree line, one notices Japan, Korea and
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China in year 2000. The large population size and/or the high physical capital per worker are
behind this nding.
It is useful to compare the results with those that would obtain if we estimated productivity
di¤erences assuming no barriers to technology adoption, as in AZ01. More formally, we let
 ! 1 see equation (22) while keeping all other parameters unchanged. AZ01 nd that
their model yields a signicantly better t than a neoclassical one-sector model such as the
one used by Hall and Jones (1999). Since our model encompasses their specication as a
particular case, we can quantify the importance of barriers, separating their e¤ect from that of
"inappropriate technology". Figure 3 is the analogue of Figure 2 but letting  !1. It shows
that the model without barriers underestimates signicantly the cross-country productivity
di¤erences.
To compare the goodness of t of the two models more formally, we use the statistic
proposed by AZ01:
<2 = 1 
nX
j=1

log(ySj=yUS)  clog(ySj=yUS)2 = nX
j=1
 
log(ySj=yUS)
2
;
where log(ySj=yUS) denotes the log-di¤erence in output per worker from the US in the data
and clog(ySj=yUS) the prediction of the model for the same country. <2 would be equal to
1, if all points were aligned on the 45-degree line. In this case, the model would t the data
perfectly. Note that <2 is not a standard R-squared, and can be negative if the t is su¢ ciently
low. Table 3 reports the <2 for the three specications of Table 2, and for comparison also the
case of no barriers (column 4). In column 1 all countries are constrained to have the same .
In column 2  is allowed to di¤er between OECD and non-OECD countries. Finally, in 3, we
also allow  to di¤er between sub-Saharan and other non-OECD countries. In all cases, the
model with barriers attains a much better t than the model with no barriers.12 The model
with no barriers is also rejected in a formal Wald test.
A concern is that our estimation may imply ALS=AL;US and/or AHS=AH;US larger than
unity, violating the assumption that the US is the technology leader in both sectors. To address
12The results are not directly comparable with those of AZ01. First their model implies  = 2; and they set
Z 2 f1:5; 1:8g to match the skill premium. Second, they use data for 1990. To make the comparison more
direct, we re-estimated our model after calibrating  = 2 and Z = 1:8; using the two educational measures from
BL for the year of 2000. The <2 of the model without barriers is 0.871 and 0.766 using sec and tert, respectively.
In contrast, the <2 of column 3 in Table 3 would be 0.940 and 0.922, respectively.
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Baseline estimation No barriers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Data Skill 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000
BL sec 0.926 0.930 0.929 0.936 0.938 0.938 0.829 0.855
CS sec 0.934 0.944 0.937 0.951 0.953 0.952 0.807 0.856
BL tert 0.905 0.903 0.910 0.913 0.923 0.921 0.690 0.763
CS tert 0.924 0.922 0.927 0.936 0.947 0.942 0.746 0.761
Table 3: Goodness of t
this concern, Figure 4 plots the implied cross-country distribution of the sectoral productivities,
ALS=AL;US and AHS=AH;US , using our estimate of the baseline model in the case of tertiary
education with BL data. The hypothesis that the US is the technology leader is never rejected
in the skilled sector. More formally, AHS=AH;US < 1 for all S. This is not surprising. More
interesting, the hypothesis that the US is the technology leader in the low-skill sector is only
contradicted in the case of China and India in 2000. This is due to the large market for low-skill
technologies available in those two countries. Since it seems empirically implausible that China
and India use all technologies currently in use in the US in the low-skill sector, this nding
suggests that the model may exaggerate the role of market size e¤ect in technology adoption.
Alternatively, the assumption that large developing economies such as China and India have
frictionless internal markets may be incorrect. Altogether, we nd it reassuring that with
only two (important) exceptions the assumption that the US is the leader is consistent with
our estimation, without the need of imposing any additional restriction.
4.3 Counterfactuals
In this section we use our model as a lab to perform three counterfactual experiments. We
assume the economies to be initially in the no-trade steady state of year 2000, and study the
long-run e¤ect of institutional changes on cross-country inequality. The three experiments con-
sist of, respectively: (i) removing all barriers to technology adoption, (ii) opening up the world
economy to frictionless international trade, and (iii) introducing, in addition, full international
IPR enforcement. We focus on steady-state e¤ects.
We limit our discussion to the tert skill measure from the Barro-Lee data set and to the
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case in which  di¤ers between OECD, sub-Saharan and other non-OECD countries (column 3
to 4 and 7 to 10 in Table 2). The parameters ;Z;  and  are held constant across experiments
at the levels of section 4.2 (with the exception of experiment (i) when we let  ! 1). Since
physical capital is endogenous, we allow the capital-output ratio to respond to institutional
changes. We do so by rst inferring from the observed capital-output ratios the cross-country
distribution of the deep parameter  (the "investment wedge") in the benchmark no-trade case.
Next, we calculate the capital-output ratio that would obtain in each of the counterfactual
steady states (no barriers, free trade and trade with full IPR enforcement) assuming no change
in : Since our target is to estimate relative productivities, we focus on the distribution of
investment wedges relative to the North. For country S such ratio is given by:
S
N
=
YS=KS
YN=KN
; (39)
where the right hand-side term is the capital-output ratio in the data, and we continue to
assume the US to be the frontier economy. Next, letting variables indexed by the superscript
count 2 fnobarr; trade; IPRg denote theoretical steady-state levels in each counterfactual, we
obtain:
KcountS
KcountN
=
Y countS =S
Y countN =N
=
Y countS
Y countN
KS=YS
KN=YN
: (40)
Replacing KS=KN by KnobarrS =K
nobarr
N ; K
trade
S =K
trade
N and K
IPR
S =K
IPR
N , respectively, into
equations (22), (30) and (34), and rearranging terms, yields the steady-state expressions for
output and productivity reported in each of the subsections below.
4.3.1 No Barriers
In this section, we experiment with slashing all technology barriers. Such experiment di¤ers
from the analysis in Section 4.2.3, as there we treated the no-barrier model as an alternative
model and estimated equation (22) taking the capital ratio directly from the data. In contrast,
here we infer the  from the benchmark case and let capital adjust in each country to the new
steady state, as discussed above. The gains in output per worker will be larger for countries with
smaller investment wedges, since slashing barriers induces a stronger increase in investments
in physical capital in those countries.
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We obtain the following counterfactual steady-state output gaps:
Y nobarrS
Y nobarrN
=

KnobarrS
KnobarrN


2664L
 1

S +

Z~hN
 ( 1)2
  (ZHS)
 1

L
 1

N +

Z~hN
 ( 1)2
  (ZHN )
 1

3775
(1 )
 1
=

KS=YS
KN=YN
 
1 

2664L
 1

S +

Z~hN
 ( 1)2
  (ZHS)
 1

L
 1

N +

Z~hN
 ( 1)2
  (ZHN )
 1

3775

 1
;
where KS=YS and KN=YN are the observed capital output ratios. Panel (a) in Figure 5 plots
the counterfactual log GDP pw relative to the US, clog(ynobarrS =ynobarrUS ); against the productivity
di¤erences predicted by the benchmark model. There are signicant gains for most countries,
which are especially large for those with small investment wedges. Among the OECD economies
making largest gains, one notices New Zealand, Korea, Hungary, Czech Repulic, Slovak Re-
public and Switzerland. On average, the GDP pw relative to the US improves for an OECD
country from 0.68 to 0.91 while non-OECD countries increase from 0.19 to 0.61. The e¤ect
is particularly strong for small countries, which lack the local market size required to benet
from expensive technologies (for instance, Cyprus improves from 0.34 to 1.05 while the United
Kingdom only increases from 0.68 to 0.77).
4.3.2 Trade
In this section we consider the e¤ects of opening up the world economy to free trade. The coun-
terfactual steady-state output di¤erences are given by equation (30), after replacing KS=KN
by KtradeS =K
trade
N ; as given by equation (40). This yields:
Y tradeS
Y tradeN
=

KS=YS
KN=YN
 
1 

L
1+

S +
(Z~hN)
(" 1) (1+)

h^
 (ZHS)
1+

L
1+

N +
(Z~hN)
(" 1) (1+)

h^
 (ZHN )
1+

:
As discussed in section 3.1, trade increases the skill bias of the frontier technology, while its
e¤ect on the skill bias of technology adoption is ambiguous.
Panel (b) in Figure 5 plots clog(ytradeS =ytradeUS ) against the predictions of the benchmark
model. Cross-country income inequality increases signicantly, and so does the distance of
most countries from the US frontier. The GDP pw relative to the US decreases for the average
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OECD country from 0.68 to 0.41, while the non-OECD countries fall from 0.19 to 0.10. Among
the OECD countries that realize the largest losses are Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, France, and
Finland. However, it is also important to remind that trade implies an increase in the growth
rate of all economies, so a loss in relative terms does not imply a welfare loss.
4.3.3 Trade and IPR
In this section, we focus on trade with perfect IPR protection, following the theoretical analysis
of section 3.2. The counterfactual steady-state output di¤erences are given by equation (34),
after replacing KS=KN by KIPRS =K
IPR
N as given by (40). This yields:
Y IPRS
Y IPRN
=

KS=YS
KN=YN
 
1 
 LS + ~wHS
LN + ~wHN
;
where ~w = max
n
Z 1(~hw) 2; Z
o
. As discussed in section 3.2, all countries use now the
frontier technology, as in the case of no barriers. However, the frontier technology is now less
skill biased. Panel (c) in Figure 5 plots clog(yIPRS =yIPRUS ) against the productivity di¤erences
predicted by the benchmark model. The results are similar to those in panel (a), but the
relative gains of non-frontier economies are larger. Many economies including most European
countries  would now surpass the US. The reason is twofold. First, the skill bias of the
technology targets the average world endowment so innovation is too little skill biased for
the most skilled rich countries such as the US. Second, many countries have a higher capital
output ratio than the US. However, it is important to remember that non-frontier countries
must transfer to the US a signicant share of their GDP as license fees. So, the di¤erences in
GNP may be signicantly larger than the di¤erences in GDP.
Overall, these results are in line with AZ01 and Bonglioli and Gancia (2008), who show in
more specic models that trade opening with no global IPR protection may induce a wave of
technological progress which favors disproportionately the North, while stronger IPR protection
in the South can speed up technology transfer and reduce income di¤erences.
4.3.4 Wage Inequality
Finally, we consider the prediction of the theory for the changes in wage inequality in the three
counterfactual scenarios relative to the benchmark case. Recall ~wS = Z  ~PS  ~AS : In autarky,
~PS and ~AS are given by (7) and (14), respectively. The same expressions hold with no barriers
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to adoption after letting  ! 1. In the free-trade case, prices are equalized worldwide to
~Pw =

Z~hN
 1
and ~AS = h^ 1

Z~hN
 1 
~hS=~hN
1=
, where h^ is given by (25). Finally,
in the case of trade with IPR, we have ~wS = max
n
Z 1(~hw) 2; Z
o
, where ~hw is the world
average relative skill endowment.
Figure 6 plots the log-change in the steady-state skill premium for tertiary school against
GDP per worker relative to the US when barriers are removed starting from the benchmark
steady state equilibrium. Removing barriers implies an increase in the skill premia of non-
frontier economies, since costly adoption reduces the skill bias of the technology adoption.
The e¤ect is stronger the farther away from the frontier a country is. For the average non-
OECD country the skill premium increases by 25 percent, while it rises only by 3 percent
among OECD countries. Figure 7 plots the corresponding log-change in the steady-state
skill premium when an economy switches to free trade. Opening up to free trade in goods
raises the skill premium in skill-abundant countries and lowers it in skill-scarce countries, as
predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, by also inducing skill-biased technical
change at the frontier, it generates an upward pressure on the skill premium worldwide. As
a result, wage inequality increases in the majority of countries, particularly in skill-abundant
and low-barriers countries. The conventional result that trade liberalization lowers inequality
in skill-scarce countries holds only in the group of economies facing the highest barriers to
technology adoption (for instance, in sub-Saharan countries the skill premium falls on average
by 42 percent), while wage inequality rises even in India and China.
Finally, when IPR are also protected (no gure), the relevant market for new technologies
becomes the world economy. This promotes the development of low-skill technologies and thus
a fall in the skill premium. Moreover, since all countries now use the same technologies, all
wages become the same everywhere. Given the large endowment of unskilled labor of the
world economy, we nd that with trade and IPR protection ~A falls so much that the constraint
~wS  Z becomes binding. Thus, in the new steady state wage inequality drops to ~w = Z
in all countries. Before concluding, it is important to emphasize that these large changes in
skill premia reect the rather extreme nature of our counterfactual scenarios. The e¤ect of
partial integration of the markets for goods and technology would certainly be smaller. It is
also important to stress that our model abstracts from di¤erences in labor market institutions
and policies which are likely to a¤ect the cross-country pattern of skill premia and its change
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under the alternative scenarios.
4.4 Robustness
In this section we analyze the robustness of our results. First, we study the robustness of
the model to di¤erent calibrations of : Then, we compare our results with those that would
obtain from an atheoretical development accounting exercise. Next, we test the robustness of
the results to a weaker form of the market size e¤ect. Last, we estimate the model under the
alternative assumption that in year 2000 all economies are open to international trade.
4.4.1 Lower Short-Run Elasticity of Substitution
In this part, we study the robustness of our model to a di¤erent calibration of : Earlier studies
nd the short-run elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor to be in the
range  2 [1:5; 2] : It is important to stress that  < 2 is inconsistent in our model with the
observation of increasing skill premia in the US during 1970-2000. To reconcile lower s with
the evolution of the skill premium in the US, we must then allow for an exogenous increase in
Z. The new calibration is summarized in Table 4, where we restrict attention to tert from the
Barro-Lee dataset which is our preferred measure of skill.
 = 2  = 1:5
Skill Z1970 Z2000 Z1970 Z2000
tert 1.57 1.88 0.51 1.52
Table 4: Robustness calibration
Table 5 shows the new estimates of . When  = 2; the results are qualitative similar to
those of the benchmark case, although the estimates of  are somewhat larger. The <2 are still
above 0.9, and the di¤erences in  across groups and time remain at the signicance level of
the baseline estimation in Table 2. In summary, our analysis is not a¤ected by setting  = 2:
When  = 1:5; the results continue to be similar to the benchmark case. The estimates go
further up, and the level of signicance reduces to 5 percent between OECD and non-OECD
countries in 2000. In spite of this, the goodness of t stays above 0.9.
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All countries OECD Non-OECD
All Sub-Sahara Others
1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000
Data Skill (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
 = 2
BL tert 3.31 3.90 6.17 12.09 3.13 3.50 2.33 2.47 4.03 4.16
(0.27) (0.35) (1.57) (3.54) (0.26) (0.31) (0.19) (0.25) (0.50) (0.49)
 = 1:5
BL tert 3.74 4.38 7.00 13.53 3.54 3.94 2.65 2.93 4.56 4.58
(0.31) (0.40) (1.86) (4.22) (0.30) (0.36) (0.22) (0.30) (0.61) (0.56)
Obs. 85 121 19 29 66 92 23 23 43 69
Table 5: Robustness estimation
4.4.2 Alternative Specications
A number of papers (discussed in the introduction) perform development accounting exercises
based on reduced form aggregate production functions such as equation (1). The wisdom of this
literature is that the model can replicate the empirical cross-country productivity distribution
as long as one imposes su¢ ciently low elasticities of substitution between factors of production.
For instance, Caselli (2005) shows that if one calibrates a production function with physical
and human capital allowing for very low values of the elasticity of substitution, one can t
arbitrarily well the cross-country data. In this paper, we allow ourselves no freedom in the
choice of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, which we taken to be unit
as it is standard in the growth accounting literature. In addition, we estimate the short-run
elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skill labor using the time-series implication of
the theory. The only parameter on which we impose no a priori restriction is . We should
note, though, that our theory imposes that the long-run elasticity of substitution between high-
and low-skill labor be larger than the short-term elasticity. Thus, estimating  does not imply
a degree of freedom in the choice of the elasticity of substitution, and our theory precludes
that a good t can arise from low elasticities.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare the success of our theory with that of a reduced
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form production function approach.13 For the sake of such comparison, we estimate the fol-
lowing alternative (reduced form) model:
YS
YN
=

KS
KN
0B@L
 1

S +

AH
AL
HS
 1

L
 1
 +

AH
AL
HN
 1

1CA
(1 )
 1
; (41)
subject to the restriction that labor markets are competitive, implying that:
AH
AL
= ( ~wUS)

 1

HN
LN
 1
 1
;
where ~wUS is the observed skill premium in the US and   0 is the elasticity of substitution
between low- and high-skill labor.
Consistent with previous studies, we nd that the best t of this model obtains with low
elasticities of substitution between high- and low-skill workers. For instance, if we measure
skill by tertiary school from the Barro-Lee data set the best estimates yield 1970 = 1:07 and
2000 = 0:50. With such low elasticities, the model ts quite well the data. In particular, we
obtain <21970 = 0:771 and <22000 = 0:916. However, the estimated elasticities are clearly outside
of the consensus range. If we impose that   1:5; the goodness of t falls signicantly. For
instance, with tertiary education and  = 1:5 one obtains <21970 = 0:726 and <22000 = 0:802
with BL and <21970 = 0:785 and <22000 = 0:800 with CS. For comparison, the corresponding
<2s of Table 3 range between 0:903 and 0:952. In addition, the reduced form model systemat-
ically underpredicts the cross-country productivity di¤erences for reasonable values of . On
both grounds, the reduced form model performs signicantly worse than our structural model
with tertiary education. In sum, a reduced form model without market-size e¤ects does not
outperform our structural model.
4.4.3 Weaker Market Size E¤ect
Our model implies a strong market size e¤ect. In this section, we test the robustness of the
results to a more general functional form for technology adoption implying that the cost of
13 It is important to note that our model is not observationally equivalent to a standard aggregate constant
returns to scale CES production function like (1) for two reasons. First, the parameter  implies a cross-
restriction between the skill bias of the adopted technology and the long-run elasticity of substitution between
high- and low-skill labor. Second, it features a market-size e¤ects in the process of technology adoption,
parameterized by the exponent (1 + ) = (+ ) > 1 in the right-hand side of (15).
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adopting new technologies may increase in market size. We assume that:
cLS = 

ALS
ALN

(LS)
 and cHS = 

AHS
AHN

(ZHS)
 ;
where   0: This model nests the benchmark case in (13) when  = 0. This specication
scales up the relative cost of technology adoption by the factor (ZHS=LS) compared to the
benchmark case and (partly) compensates for the market size e¤ect in relative prots if  > 0.
This allows us to analyze models with a weaker market size e¤ect. Relative output is then
given by
YS
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 2664L
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;
which shows that the long-run elasticity of substitution as well as the scale e¤ect is a¤ected
by the parameter .
We estimate the model under this alternative specication. The constraint that   0 turns
out to be binding for sub-Saharan countries. The estimated value of  is 0:584 (s.e. 0:006)
for year 1970 and 0:576 (s.e. 0:007) for year 2000. The estimated values of  for 1970 are
0:63 (s.e. 0:30) for OECD countries and 0:24 (s.e. 0:10) for non-OECD countries (excluding
sub-Saharan countries). The corresponding values for year 2000 are 1:18 (s.e. 0:47) for OECD
countries and 0:18 (s.e. 0:08) for non-OECD countries (excluding Sub-saharan countries). The
goodness of t, <2 = 0:934 in 1970 and <2 = 0:926 in 2000, is marginally higher than in the
benchmark model.
The results are qualitatively consistent with those in the benchmark model: the estimate
of  increases signicantly (by a factor of two) between 1970 and 2000 for OECD countries,
while there is no signicant change (the point estimate being in fact somewhat lower) for non-
OECD countries. However, the estimated barriers are signicantly larger for all countries, or
equivalently the elasticity of technology adoption to the distance to the frontier is lower. In
addition, it appears as if there is no technology spillover to sub-Saharan countries that develop
their technologies in complete isolation ( = 0). It is worth remarking that the improvement
in the tness is only marginal, indicating that the data cannot discriminate clearly between
the two models.
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4.4.4 Openness
In our analysis, we have followed the tradition of the development accounting literature assum-
ing all economies to be closed. Free trade was only considered as a counterfactual. However,
the absence of trade is a straightjacket, especially for more recent years. For this reason, in
this section we re-estimate the model under the alternative assumption that there is free trade
in year 2000, based on the results of Proposition 2.
Under free trade, the estimated barriers for OECD countries become very small, i.e., the
estimated  is very high and also imprecisely estimated. The restriction that there are no
technological barriers for OECD countries cannot be rejected at standard condence levels.14
Therefore, we impose the constraint that  !1 for OECD countries. We report the result of
the estimation using tertiary schooling from BL as the measure of skill. This results in  = 10:06
(s.e. 1:81) for the non-OECD non-sub-Saharan countries and  = 3:88 (s.e. 0:63) for the sub-
Saharan countries. Therefore, estimating the model under free trade yields signicantly lower
barriers to technology. Interestingly, the open economy model ts better the data (<2 = 0:934)
than the closed-economy model. Figure 8 shows that there is a signicant improvement in the
t of emerging economies such as China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Mexico and Brazil. This
is consistent with the observation that these economies are very open to international trade.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have built and estimated a model of the world income distribution based
on the following ingredients: di¤erent types of labor (skilled and unskilled workers), cross-
country di¤erences in factor endowments and in the cost of capital, factor-biased (directed)
technical progress and costly technology adoption. Our framework accounts for three sources
of income di¤erences: barriers to technology adoption, the inappropriateness (excessive skill-
bias) of frontier technologies to local conditions and capital market imperfections. While each
of these elements is not new, our contribution is to combine them into a unied empirical
model which can be used to gauge the relative importance of di¤erent factors generating low
productivity and to perform counterfactual experiments.
We summarize here the major ndings. First, despite the parsimonious specication, the
14 In practice, we test that 2000 =1
00000000 cannot be rejected for the OECD countries.
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model provides a good t of the world income distribution. This suggests that the theory of
directed technical change is broadly consistent with aggregate data once properly extended to
consider technology adoption and international spillovers. Second, both barriers to adoption
and the excessive skill-bias of frontier technologies appear to be quantitatively important. We
nd that barriers are higher in less developed countries and that they have fallen over time
for OECD countries only. The complete removal of barriers would increase output per worker
relative to the US (the e¤ect is more pronounced for non-OECD countries) and would lead to
higher skill premia. Third, we have used the model to study how the forces of globalization
can shape the world income distribution. In the absence of global IPR protection, we nd that
integration of good markets is followed by SBTC, higher income disparities, and rising skill
premia in the majority of countries. These results are however reverted if trade liberalization
is coupled with international protection of IPR.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of interesting directions. For
instance, we have estimated our benchmark model under the assumption of no international
trade and we have then studied globalization as a counterfactual experiment. While this is
useful to understand the e¤ects of economic integration, an alternative route would have been
to estimate the model taking into account the degree of openness of each country. Finally,
although our theory suggests that the removal of barriers to technology adoption has strong
distributional consequences, we have not explored how these may generate a political support
for the existence of barriers. We believe that including these consideration into the model may
shed some light on the important question of which political institutions and reforms can be
useful to speed up the much needed process of technological convergence.
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Figure 1: Steady state comparative statics
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Figure 2: Baseline estimation: GDP pw (log-difference from the US)
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(a) 1970, secondary schooling
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(b) 1970, tertiary schooling
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(c) 2000, secondary schooling
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(d) 2000, tertiary schooling
Note: plots l̂og(yS/yUS) against log(yS/yUS) across time and skill categories, ξ varies across OECD, sub-
Saharan and other countries.
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Figure 3: No barriers to technology adoption: GDP pw (log-difference from the US)
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(a) 1970, secondary schooling
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(b) 1970, tertiary schooling
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(c) 2000, secondary schooling
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(d) 2000, tertiary schooling
Note: plots l̂og(yS/yUS) against log(yS/yUS) across time and skill categories, ξ →∞ for all countries.
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Figure 4: Sectoral productivities (relative to the US)
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(a) 1970, high-skill sector
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(b) 1970, low-skill sector
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(c) 2000, high-skill sector
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(d) 2000, low-skill sector
Note: plots AHS/AH,US and ALS/AL,US against log(yS/yUS) across time for the tertiary skill category. ξ
varies across OECD, sub-Saharan and other countries.
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Figure 5: Counterfactual GDP pw (log-difference from the US)
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(a) No barriers to technology adoption
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(b) Free trade
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(c) Free trade and perfect IPR protection
Note: plots l̂og(ycountS /y
count
US ) against l̂og(yS/yUS) in 2000 for the tertiary schooling category. ξ varies
across OECD, sub-Saharan and other countries.
43
Figure 6: Change in skill premium: benchmark to no barrier counterfactual
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Note: plots l̂ogw˜nobarrJ − l̂ogw˜J in 2000 for the tertiary schooling
category. ξ varies across OECD, sub-Saharan and other countries.
Figure 7: Change in skill premium: benchmark to free trade counterfactual
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Note: plots l̂ogw˜tradeJ − l̂ogw˜J in 2000 for the tertiary schooling
category. ξ varies across OECD, sub-Saharan and other countries.
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Figure 8: Open Economy Estimation: GDP pw (log-difference from the US)
ALB
ARE
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
BEN
BGD
BGR
BHRBLZ
BOL
BRA
BRB BRN
BWA
CANCHE
CHL
CHN
CMR
COL
CRI
CUB
CYP
CZE
DNK
DOM
DZAECU
EGY
ESP
EST
FIN
FJI
FRA
GBR
GER
GHA
GMB
GRC
GUY
HKG
HND
HRV
HUN
IDNIND
IRL
IRN
IRQ
ISL
ITA
JAM
JOR
JPN
KAZ
KEN
KHM
KOR
LAO
LBR
LBY
LKA
LSO
LTU
LUX
LVA
MAC
M RMDA
MEX
MLI
MLT
MN
MOZ
MRT
MUS
MWI
MYS
NAM
NER
NIC
NLDNO
NPL
NZL
PAK
PANPERPHL
PNG
POL
PRT
PRY
QAT
ROM
RWA
SAU
SENSLE
SLV
SVK
SVN
SWE
SWZ
SYR
THA
TON
TTO
TUN
TUR
TZA
UGA
URY
USA
VEN
VNM
YEM
ZAF
ZMB
ZWE
−
4
−
3
−
2
−
1
0
M
od
el
 p
re
di
ct
io
n
−4 −3 −2 −1 0
Data
Note: plots l̂og(yS/yUS) against log(yS/yUS) for the open economy
estimation in 2000, ξ varies across OECD, sub-Saharan and other
countries.
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